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Berys Gaut’s Failed Revival of Medium-Specificity
I. Introduction
Most people concerned with the task of understanding art generally and art works
specifically agree that we ought to have some kind of analytic framework which allows us
to talk about art works and media. Of the many functions of talking about art works and
media that such an analytic framework should be able to perform, some of the more
important ones include explanation and evaluation. That is, any useful analytic
framework should provide us with some guidelines as to what information is relevant in
the explanation and evaluation of particular art works. Furthermore, any useful
framework should also provide us with some principle that governs the conditions under
which a medium constitutes an art form. Despite the general agreement about what an
analytic framework for talking about art works and media should accomplish, there has
been widespread disagreement about the specifics of the correct framework. One kind of
framework that has received a lot of attention is the medium-specificity framework.
Proponents of medium-specificity frameworks argue that in explaining and evaluating art
works, one should pay special attention to the unique or distinctive properties of the
medium of the art work. These unique or distinctive properties not only play a part in the
explanation and evaluation of particular art works, but also in establishing media as
independent art forms.
Although the recent attention received by medium-specificity frameworks has been
largely negative,1 one contemporary champion of medium-specificity frameworks, Berys
Gaut, has emerged with his own, original medium-specific framework. In this paper, I
1

See my appendix on Carroll for both an account of some of his more prominent
arguments against medium-specificity, as well as a full bibliography of his relevant works.
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first look at two historical examples of medium-specificity claims, those made by André
Bazin and Rudolf Arnheim in their defense of film as an art form. After setting the stage
with this exposition of some historical medium-specificity claims, I turn to a discussion of
Gaut’s original medium-specificity framework, paying particular attention to how Gaut
adapts traditional medium-specificity claims. Once I have explained Gaut’s framework, I
will argue that it fails to satisfy the functions of medium-specificity frameworks given
above in any interesting, non-trivial way, and thus fails as a plausible framework for the
understanding of art works and media.

II. Traditional Medium-Specificity Claims
Medium-specificity claims have had a long history in the philosophy of art.
Historically, medium-specificity claims have most often been invoked to legitimize
emerging media as independent art forms. This legitimizing function was played most
prominently by appeals to what theorists today call unique properties. Properties of a
medium are unique to it if they appear only in that medium. Proponents of traditional
medium-specificity claims and frameworks argue that if one can show that an emerging
medium, such as film, possesses certain properties that are unique to it, then one can
show that the emerging medium constitutes an independent art form. Furthermore, once
one has established an emerging medium as an independent art form, appeals to unique
properties of that medium can also ground claims about which particular art works in
that medium are to be valued, as well as provide guidelines as to what the artist working
in that medium ought to do with that medium. In the remainder of this section, I will
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critically discuss several traditional medium-specificity claims made by two early film
theorists, André Bazin and Rudolf Arnheim.

André Bazin
For Bazin, photographic media, such as photography and film, are media that are
uniquely capable of objectively reproducing reality. He writes:
The photographic image is the object itself no matter how fuzzy, distorted,
or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value…it shares, by
virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it
is the reproduction; it is the model. (14, original emphasis)
While other media, such as painting, have often attempted to depict the objects of their
paintings objectively, for Bazin this desire is a futile one. “No matter how skillful the
painter,” writes Bazin, “his work [is] always in fee to an inescapable subjectivity” (12).
This inescapable subjectivity comes about due to the way in which painters exert
complete creative control over their creations. Photographic representations of objects,
however, are not inherently subjective in this same way, for they come about partly due to
mechanical processes, over which artists exert no control. A painter can, in some sense,
realistically represent a horse on one of her canvases, in that her painting might faithfully
reproduce what a horse looks like in real life. But a filmmaker, argues Bazin, can show us
the horse itself. The filmmaker’s representation of a horse objectively reproduces that
horse, whereas the painter’s representation of the horse merely provides a likeness of the
horse that she was painting—if in fact she was painting an actual horse.
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Photographic media are unique, then, in that they are able to objectively reproduce
reality. There are at least two different photographic media, however, photography and
film. Both objectively reproduce reality in the way described above, yet the photographer
is only able to objectively reproduce one fixed moment at a time, whereas the filmmaker
is able to objectively reproduce extended periods of time. For this reason, Bazin refers to
film as “objectivity in time,” or, perhaps more intuitively, objectivity over time (14). “For
the first time,” writes Bazin, “the image of things is likewise the image of their duration”
(14). Because film is the medium uniquely capable of objectively reproducing reality over
time, Bazin locates the aesthetic possibilities of film in this ability.

Rudolf Arnheim
Unlike Bazin, who appeals to film’s ability to objectively reproduce reality in order
to legitimize it as an art form, Arnheim appeals to what he thinks is film’s inability to
objectively reproduce reality. In his book Film as Art, Arnheim identifies a multitude of
ways in which films not only fail to objectively reproduce reality, but also manage it
transform it in a way that is distinctive of film. Films, argues Arnheim, are always limited
to a single perspective. Each shot in a traditional photographic film comes from a single
camera, which is only capable of providing the viewer one perspective—its own (9-10).
One cannot stop a film and walk around the screen to see the other side of the projected
scene, as one might be able to do with something like a tree or even a sculpture. Writing
in the 1930s, Arnheim knew film as a black and white medium, whereas the world
around him was obviously not black and white, but full of color. As a result, Arnheim
argues that things which look dissimilar in real life, such as watermelons and blueberries,
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might look more similar in a black and white film, since shades of gray don’t differ as
drastically as green and blue (15). These are only two of Arnheim’s many examples of
how films fail to objectively reproduce reality in their own distinct ways. Though I could
go on, I think these two examples will suffice to sustain the remainder of my discussion of
Arnheim.
For Arnheim, not only do films fail to objectively reproduce reality, but they fail
to do so in ways that are unique to the film medium. It is in virtue of these particular
failures of the film medium to reproduce reality that, Arnheim argues, film is capable of
producing artistically significant works of art. Arnheim writes, “a film art developed only
gradually when the movie makers began consciously or unconsciously to cultivate the
peculiar possibilities of cinematographic technique” (35, emphasis mine). Although
Arnheim disagrees with Bazin, then, about film’s ability to objectively reproduce reality,
he, like Bazin, nonetheless appeals to film’s unique properties (or limitations) in order to
legitimize film as an art form.

Unique Properties and Further Claims
As I have shown above, Bazin and Arnheim disagree with regards to which
features of the film medium allow it to produce artistically significant works of art,
thereby making it an independent art form. For Bazin, this possibility rests in film’s ability
to objectively reproduce reality, whereas for Arnhem this possibility rests in film’s
particular inability to objectively reproduce reality. Despite their disagreement regarding
the nature of film’s reproductive abilities, however, both Bazin and Arnheim believe that
film is an art form because it can achieve artistic affects not possible in any other medium.
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For both Bazin and Arnheim, these unique artistic affects are possible because the film
medium possesses some property that is unique to it, whether that’s the property of being
able to objectively reproduce reality better than other media or to deviate and transform
reality in a distinctively cinematic way.
From this starting point, Bazin and Arnheim also go on to make some further
claims. These claims, likewise, appeal to the unique properties of the film medium. The
most famous of these claims has to do with what artists ought to do in the film medium.
Since Bazin thinks the aesthetic qualities of film are to be found in its ability to objectively
reproduce reality over a period of time, he advocates a style of filmmaking that relies
heavily on “realistic” techniques, such as the use of long takes and deep focus. By
employing long takes, filmmakers capitalize on the time aspect of Bazin’s claim that film
is objectivity in time, whereas by employing deep focus, filmmakers capitalize on the
objective aspect of that claim. Arnheim, on the other hand, advocates a style of
filmmaking generally opposed to the kind of realism advocated by Bazin. Arnheim doesn’t
think there is anything artistic in objectively reproducing reality, so he calls for
filmmakers to deviate as much as possible from reality.
But if filmmakers ought to do the kinds of things advocated by Bazin and
Arnheim, then it seems to follow that for Bazin and Arnheim, the films that we ought to
value will be quite different. In this sense, not only do Bazin and Arnheim provide
normative guidelines for filmmakers, but they also provide criteria for determining which
films are successful, and thus ought to be valued. Specifically, the films we ought to value
are those films which exploit the unique properties of the film medium, whether that is
objectively reproducing reality (for Bazin) or deviating and transforming reality (for
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Arnheim). Films that fail to exploit the unique properties of the film medium are to be
thought of as cinematic failures. That is, if Arnheim were to watch a film created by a
filmmaker influenced by Bazin’s views of the medium, he would deem that film a failure,
for it fails to deviate from and transform reality in any artistically significant way.
Likewise, if Bazin were to watch a film created by a filmmaker influenced by Arnheim’s
views of the medium, he would deem that film a failure, for it fails to objectively
reproduce reality in any artistically significant way.
I have explained how two traditional medium-specificity theorists combine a set of
medium-specificity claims to create a framework that allows them not only to determine
whether or not a particular medium, film, constitutes an art form, but also to develop
normative guidelines for artists working in the film medium, as well as criteria for which
films should be thought of as artistic successes. Let me now turn to Gaut’s more recent
medium-specificity framework.

III. Gaut’s Medium-Specificity Framework
Gaut’s medium-specific framework is based on three central medium-specificity
claims, the explanatory claim (MSX), the evaluative claim (MSV), and the constitutive
claim (MSF). Gaut formulates these three claims as follows:
(MSX) Correct explanations of some of the artistic properties of artworks
refer to distinctive properties of the medium in which these
artworks occur. (287)
(MSV) Some correct artistic evaluations of artworks refer to distinctive
properties of the medium in which these artworks occur. (286)
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(MSF)

For a medium to constitute an art form it must instantiate artistic
properties that are distinct from those that are instantiated by other
media. (287)

Since Gaut’s explicit goal is to defend these three claims as both true and
interesting medium-specificity claims, it will be instructive to briefly compare them to the
claims made by Bazin and Arnheim. Traditional medium-specificity claims can be
characterized by the way that they invoke the concepts of “medium” and “specificity,”
particularly as those concepts relate to the evaluation and explanation of particular art
works. In traditional medium-specificity claims, the medium is not only the vehicle
through which an artist communicates her ideas, but also a “genuinely explanatory”
element of the art works that appear in that medium (Gaut 292). To be more precise,
according to proponents of traditional medium-specificity claims, such as Bazin and
Arnheim, the medium has specific features or properties that play a role in the
explanations and evaluations of the art works in that medium. For Bazin and Arnheim,
the specific features or properties of the medium that play a role in the explanations and
evaluations of the art works that medium are those features or properties that are unique
to the medium. In the case of film, the relevant unique features or properties, according to
Bazin and Arnheim, are the ability or inability to objectively reproduce reality.
Looking at Gaut’s three claims above, it’s clear that Gaut puts a lot of stock in
what he calls “distinctive properties.” Although many theorists use the word “distinctive”
synonymously with the word “unique,” Gaut does not. Keeping this in mind, it makes
sense to ask two general questions:
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(1)

How does distinctiveness differ from uniqueness, and can claims which
refer to distinctive properties be considered medium-specificity claims?

(2a) What does Gaut’s divergence from traditional medium-specificity
claims accomplish, and (2b) are his medium-specificity claims
theoretically superior to previous medium-specificity claims in virtue of
this divergence?

The First Question: Gaut’s Notion of Specificity
In section II, I characterized traditional medium-specificity claims partly by their
appeals to unique properties. Gaut, however, denies that a claim or general framework
must appeal to unique properties in order to count as medium-specific. Instead, he argues
that one’s claims or general framework need only appeal to what he calls differential
properties.2 A property is differential for Gaut if “it distinguishes one group of media, the
target class, from another group of media, the contrast class” (291). Unique properties are
a subset of differential properties, in which “there is only one member of the target class
and the contrast class consists of all other media” (291). One might worry that
broadening the scope of acceptable properties in this way might create problems for
someone looking to defend a medium-specificity framework, but Gaut denies that this is
the case. He writes:

2

For Gaut, differential properties are distinctive, in that Gaut thinks that our
“understanding of [distinctness] should be in terms of differential properties—properties
that distinguish one group of media from another group, but that are not necessarily
unique to any particular medium” (291-2). For the remainder of this essay, I will use the
term “differential” in place of “distinctive.”
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The notion of diﬀerential properties provides a useful analytic framework
for discussing the relations between diﬀerent media, and provides us with
the capacity to locate precisely which features ﬁgure, for instance, in
explanations of the artistic properties of diﬀerent art forms. (292)
According to Gaut, then, differential properties can do the same kind of work that unique
properties can, but without any of the problems commonly associated with the use of
unique properties. That is, Gaut thinks that a medium-specificity framework built upon
differential properties can accomplish the same kinds of things that people like Bazin and
Arnheim attempted to accomplish, all while avoiding the criticisms regularly leveled
against traditional medium-specificity claims.3 The primary work that both differential
and unique properties can do, according to Gaut, is twofold. First, differential and unique
properties provide us with the capacity to locate precisely at least some of the features of
a given medium that figure in explanations and evaluations of art works in that medium.
Second, since differential and unique properties govern the conditions under which media
constitute art forms, they provide us with the capacity to determine which media
constitute art forms. For this reason, Gaut thinks that, in general, our “understanding of
[distinctness or specificity] should be in terms of differential properties—properties that
distinguish one group of media from another group, but that are not necessarily unique to
any particular medium” (291-2).

For an overview of some arguments against traditional medium-specificity claims, see my
appendix on Carroll.
3
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The Second Question: The Superiority of Gaut’s framework
I have already mentioned that much of the attention medium-specificity
frameworks have received lately has been negative. The most vocal critic of mediumspecificity has been Noël Carroll, who argues that media do not, in fact, possess any
unique properties. Insofar as that’s true, so long as proponents of medium-specific
frameworks attempt to incorporate unique properties into their frameworks, those
frameworks will be philosophically indefensible. Although the substance of those critiques
is beyond the scope of this paper, it’s worth noting that Gaut has taken some of the
criticisms seriously enough to formulate his version of a medium-specificity framework
without appealing to unique properties. In what looks like a clear nod to Carroll (and a
rejection of at least some of the claims made by Bazin and Arnheim), Gaut concedes that
“there are many false or uninteresting versions of [traditional] medium-speciﬁcity claims”
(306). However, he thinks that his new medium-specificity framework, and MSX, MSV,
and MSF in particular, are neither false nor uninteresting. In the remainder of this paper, I
will argue that this is not actually that case, and that MSX, MSV, and MSF, even if they
are true, are uninteresting.

Gaut’s Explanatory (MSX) and Evaluative (MSV) Claims
Gaut anticipates my argument against his medium-specificity framework, though
he hasn’t quite worked out its implications. He writes:
It might be thought that the substitution of diﬀerential for unique properties
would eviscerate medium-speciﬁc claims of all interest, perhaps rendering
them trivial. For if one can group media as one wishes into target and
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contrast classes, then it may appear that there are no constraints on theory,
unlike the uniqueness case, where only one grouping (one medium,
contrasted with all other media) is mandated. (292)
For Gaut, the worry is that, as he puts it, the substitution of differential properties
for unique properties eliminates any constraints on his theory. It’s not clear exactly what
this is supposed to be mean, but Gaut obviously does not see this as a problem, since he
thinks that a framework built on differential properties is just as useful as a framework
built on unique properties. I’m unconvinced of this. The ability to, as Gaut puts it, group
media as one wishes does seem problematic, because it looks like that ability is going to
eviscerate Gaut’s medium-specificity claims of all specificity.
The evisceration of specificity from Gaut’s framework follows directly from Gaut’s
definition of a differential property. Recall that for Gaut, a property is differential if it
distinguishes one group of media from another group of media. It follows that any
property of a medium can be differential. Consider the following two comparisons of
film, literature, and painting.
(FL) Film is a medium which employs images. Some other media, such as
literature, do not employ images. Thus, the employment of images is a
differential property of film.
(FP) Film is a medium which employs images. Some other media, such as
painting, also employ images. Thus, the employment of images is not
a differential property of film.
Notice that both comparisons refer to the same property of film, the property of
employing images. However, the very same property is differential in (FL) but not
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differential in (FP). Whether a property is differential in Gaut’s sense or not is context
sensitive, depending on the specific parameters of the comparison being made.
Notice that the same is not true of unique properties. The uniqueness of a property
in no way depends on the parameters of any particular comparison. A property of a
medium either is or is not unique. That is, a property of a medium is either only possessed
by that medium or not. No amount of creative comparison-crafting can make a unique
property not unique or vice-versa. Presumably, this feature of unique properties is
precisely why they have been employed in traditional medium-specificity frameworks.
Unique properties are not context specific, thus enabling the proponent of a mediumspecificity framework to assert unequivocally which specific properties of a medium are
relevant in the explanation and evaluation of art works appearing in that medium.
This is a significant difference between differential and unique properties, and it
seriously calls into question Gaut’s claim that differential properties can be just as useful
as unique properties when it comes to formulating medium-specificity frameworks. This is
obvious when one reformulates MSX and MSV in light of the discussion of differential
properties above. When one does this, one gets two claims which, contrary to Gaut’s
assertions, do in fact seem trivial, for they seem to claim nothing more than that some
correct explanations and evaluations of art works refer to some properties of the media in
which those art works appear. Not only do these two claims appear to be trivial, but they
also fail to satisfy the useful theoretical roles that Gaut attributes to traditional mediumspecificity frameworks. For Gaut, one of the primary functions of medium-specificity
frameworks is to provide us with the capacity to locate precisely at least some of the
features of a given medium that figure in explanations and evaluations of art works in
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that medium. Differential properties, however, seem to fail at this function on even the
most charitable readings of Gaut’s claims.

Gaut’s Constitutive (MSF) Claim
Gaut’s third and final medium-specificity claim is the constitutive claim (MSF):
(MSF) For a medium to constitute an art form it must instantiate artistic
properties that are distinct from those that are instantiated by other
media. (287)
Insofar as MSF takes the same form as MSX and MSV, it appears to be open to
the same criticism that I develop above. That is, if Gaut’s use of the term “distinctive” in
MSF is to be understood in terms of differential properties, then it seems to follow that
MSF says nothing more than that for a medium to constitute an art form is must
instantiate some artistic property. That hardly seems like a substantive medium-specificity
claim, however, since it fails to pick out precisely which artistic properties of a given
medium govern whether or not that medium constitutes an art form.4
There’s good reason, however, to think that Gaut here has reverted to
understanding “distinctive” in terms of unique, rather than differential, properties.5 For
Gaut, MSF “fits naturally with the perspective of an artist confronted with a new
medium” (300). He thinks that when an artist is confronted with a new medium, a
natural question for her to ask is “what…can [I] do now that is of artistic interest that [I]
4

5

Furthermore, the claim is false, for reasons I give below.

This isn’t entirely fair to Gaut, since he thinks that unique properties are a subset of
differential properties. The important thing to note, however, is that MSX and MSV do
not refer to unique properties at all, whereas MSF seems to only refer to unique
properties.
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could not do before?” (301). Notice how strange this question is if we take Gaut to be
using the term “distinctive” in the way he’s been using it above, namely in the non-unique
sense of “differential.” For a medium to instantiate a differential property is just for it to
instantiate a property that distinguishes it from another medium. But if that property is
merely differential (and not also unique), then it’s a property that is shared by some other
medium. But if that’s the case, then it’s impossible for the artist confronted with a new
medium to do anything that she couldn’t do before. To make sense of Gaut’s motivation
for MSF, then, it appears necessary to understand “distinctive” in MSF in terms of unique
properties. Since MSF refers to unique properties rather than differential properties, it’s
not vulnerable to the criticism that I develop above. That being said, I think that MSF
remains problematic.
As I noted above, MSF is most often invoked “when a theorist tries to show that
an emerging medium constitutes an art form” (300). Although it may be the case that a
principle like MSF is often invoked to defend emerging media as art forms, it seems
instructive to ask whether or not it is in fact necessary to invoke such a principle. Carroll,
for example, argues that a medium’s status as an art form can only be justified by
appealing to “works of aesthetic excellence” that appear in that medium (“Medium
Specificity Arguments” 19). Carroll argues theoretical principles like MSF are not
compelling in the absence of actual examples of aesthetic excellence, for “if a medium has
no compelling accomplishments…it is idle to claim it is an established art” (“Medium
Specificity Arguments” 19).
Gaut rejects Carroll’s line of reasoning. If Carroll’s arguments are correct, argues
Gaut, then it appears that one would be able to defend the ridiculous view that compact
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discs are an art form. In support of this view, Gaut argues that one can point to the
multitude of works of aesthetic excellence that have been recorded on compact discs.
This, he thinks, is a bad argument, because “the fact that a medium contains great works
does not show that the medium constitutes an art form. For a medium can contain
recordings of great works, but is not thereby itself an art form” (301, original emphasis).
Gaut is clearly correct to deny that compact discs constitute an art form, but he’s
wrong to think that such a conclusion is a consequence of Carroll’s view. Carroll can
deny that compact discs constitute an art form because, as Gaut says, compact discs are
“merely a storage medium,” and therefore there have been no works of aesthetic
excellence produced in the compact disc medium (302). This might sound like Carroll is
simply implicitly assuming something like MSF, but I’m unconvinced that that’s the case.
For Gaut, the relevant consideration for whether or not a medium is an art form is
whether or not it instantiates any unique artistic properties. Compact discs fail in this
respect, because they don’t instantiate any unique artistic properties. All compact discs do
is store musical recordings, but that’s no different than what vinyl records, audiotapes,
and MP3 files do. But notice that the compact disc medium fails not only to instantiate
any unique artistic properties, but also to instantiate any significant artistic properties at
all. An artist can’t employ the compact disc medium to produce an art work, because
there are no artistic properties, unique or not, that the compact disc medium has
independent of those works that are stored on it. That is, it may be the case that the
musical recordings stored on a particular compact disc instantiate many significant artistic
properties, but the compact disc itself instantiates only the property of storing musical
recordings. But if a given medium, such as the compact disc medium, instantiates no
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significant artistic properties independent of the works that are stored on it, then it
follows that one can’t do anything artistically significant in that medium. And if one can’t
do anything artistically significant in a given medium, then it follows that it’s going to be
impossible for anyone to point to any works of aesthetic excellence produced in that
medium. But the inability to point to any works of aesthetic excellence produced in the
compact disc medium is all that Carroll needs to say that compact discs do not constitute
an art form. Carroll, then, can account for the fact that compact discs don’t constitute an
art form without having to appeal to something like MSF.
It should be noted that the inability of the compact disc medium to produce any
significant art works doesn’t follow from the fact that it fails to instantiate any unique
artistic properties, as MSF states. In fact, it seems perfectly plausible that there exist media
that instantiate no unique properties but are still capable of producing artistically
significant works of art—by employing merely differential properties, for example. What
those media have to do, however, is instantiate some artistic property, but there’s no
reason to think that the property has to be unique to that medium. One might think it
strange that I’ve just reintroduced a claim that I earlier rejected as an uninteresting
medium-specificity claim. Notice, however, that for me, this is a necessary condition for a
given medium to constitute an art form, but it is by no means sufficient, like it would be
on the medium-specific reading above. For a medium to constitute an art form it has to
do more than simply instantiate some artistic property. In order to defend a medium as an
art form, one has to be able to point to some works of aesthetic excellence in that medium
that employs some artistic property of that medium. This condition is important because
it seems odd to claim that there exist art forms that currently have no works of aesthetic
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excellence that belong to them. There mere possibility of a medium being able to
constitute an art form is not enough to show that the medium is, in fact, an art form, in
the same way that the mere possibility that a lump of clay might be transformed into a
sculpture is not enough to show that that lump of clay actually is a sculpture. What one
needs in both of these cases is actual empirical evidence, which comes in the form of
concrete examples of works of aesthetic excellence in those media that are vying for the
status of art form, and not a theoretical principle such as MSF.

IV. Conclusion
Although medium-specificity frameworks have found a contemporary champion in
Berys Gaut, his new medium-specificity framework fails to provide any interesting
medium-specificity claims. All three of Gaut’s medium-specificity claims are either trivial
or unnecessary. Gaut’s medium-specificity framework fails to be a plausible framework
for the understanding of art works because it fails to make any non-trivial claims
regarding what information is relevant in the explanation and evaluation of art works.
Furthermore, Gaut’s attempt to capture the conditions under which media constitute art
forms turns out to be unnecessary, for it’s possible to decide which media constitute art
forms without having to appeal medium-specificity at all. As such, Gaut’s framework fails
to satisfy the functions assigned to medium-specificity frameworks by Gaut in any
interesting, non-trivial way, and thus fails as a plausible framework for the understanding
of art works and media.
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Appendix: Noël Carroll’s Objections to Medium-Specificity Claims
For the last several decades, Noël Carroll has been the most vocal opponent of
medium-specificity claims. Since I was not able to include many of his arguments
regarding medium-specificity claims in the body of my departmental thesis, I thought it
would be helpful to have an appendix in which I explain some of what I consider to be
Carroll’s most powerful objections to medium-specificity claims. Many of the arguments
below will not be directly relevant to the argumentation that occurs within my thesis, but
I hope that my discussion of them will provide some context to my debate with Berys
Gaut, particularly with regards to some of the theoretical moves that Gaut makes, many
of which I think he makes to avoid some of the criticisms below.

The problem of identifying the pertinent medium
To get this argument started, we’re going to need to know something very basic
about Carroll’s view regarding what constitutes a medium. Carroll believes that if a
medium is anything at all, then it must be something physical. Thus, if a particular art
form possesses a medium, that medium will be some sort of physical thing, whether it is
“the material stuff of which artworks are made” or the “implement used to produce an
artwork” (“Forget the Medium!” 5). The problem, according to Carroll, is that on this
conception of the medium, most, if not all, art forms cannot be said to have just one
medium.
Consider the case of film. When we go to the movie theatre, we are likely to refer
to anything that gets projected on the screen as a film, just as when we go to the Lucian
Freud exhibit at the art museum, we are likely to refer to anything that hangs on the wall
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as a painting. But films, like paintings, are not made out of one particular kind of thing.
There exist, for example, a multitude of different types of film stocks that
cinematographers can employ in the creation of a particular film, all of which will alter
the recorded scene in their own unique way. Some will record the scene in color, whereas
others will record the scene in black and white. Some will record the scene with lots of
grain, whereas others will reduce the amount of grain. Furthermore, Carroll argues that
one need not use film stock at all, as in the case of fully-digital films. Even if we exclude
fully-digital films from consideration here, however, we still have to account for flicker
films, which are “made by alternating clear and opaque leader, sans photographic
emulsion” (“Defining the Moving Image” 51). Flicker films, then, like fully-digital films,
also do not make use of any photographic film stock.
The medium-specificity theorist also cannot appeal to the camera as the physical
thing that constitutes the medium of film, for one can make certain kinds of films, such as
scratch films, that do not require the use of a camera at all (“Forget the Medium!” 6). In
scratch films, the filmmaker scratches something directly onto the film stock, which can
then be projected in the typical way. Stan Brakhage’s Mothlight (1963) similarly avoids
the use of a camera. Instead of scratching something onto the film stock, Brakhage put
leaves, dead insects, flower petals, and other things between two pieces of film, then ran
that through an optical printer to create a film strip that could be run through a projector.
Both of these processes completely bypass the use of a camera to record events that will
be projected later, and yet they are still films, which Carroll thinks shows that the camera
cannot be the film medium.
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Although I have used the case of film above, it looks like Carroll is going to be to
make the same argument when it comes to painting and many other art forms. Like film,
Carroll argues that painting as an art form constituted by more than one medium. There
is not, for example, just one kind of paint, but a multitude of different kinds of paint,
such as oil paints, acrylic paints, watercolor paints, etc. Furthermore, there are many
implements that one can use in painting, such as a paint brush, a spatula, or even a finger.
The upshot of Carroll’s argument seems to be that given the multitude of physical
things that one could choose as the physical thing to constitute the medium of a particular
art form, choosing just one seems to be completely arbitrary. There is no principled
reason to choose one physical medium over another to constitute a particular art form.
Thus, art forms are not associated with a medium with a unique nature, but many
possible media, hence the problem of identifying the pertinent medium.

Priority of artistic purpose and use of the medium
According to Carroll, one thesis that medium-specificity theorists hold is that the
nature of a particular medium dictates how that medium ought to be used. The nature of
the film medium, a medium-specificity theorist might argue, dictates that the film medium
ought to be used to further X, where X stands in for whatever that theorist takes to be
distinctive of the film medium. To do anything other than X with film, on this account,
would be to misuse that medium, since the nature of the medium dictates that one should
only further X.
When we actually look at the histories of particular art forms, however, we
discover that often contradictory domains of development are grounded in one and the
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same medium. Carroll illustrates this by pointing out that both the Russian montagists
and the French realists found justification for their contradictory styles in the nature of
the film medium. The montagists, who believed that film’s emotional force came from the
editing together or “collision” of two or more shots, appealed to film’s “facility of
juxtaposition” whereas the realists, who decried the kind of editing done by the
montagists as manipulative and propagandistic, appealed to “the causal relation between
image and referent” (“Medium Specificity Arguments” 13). In light of seemingly
intractable disagreements such as the one above, Carroll urges us to invert the
relationship between the medium and what is done with it. Whereas medium-specificity
theorists argue that the nature of the medium determines how an artist ought to use that
medium, Carroll argues that artists’ use of a particular medium ought to determine how
we conceive of that medium. As Carroll himself puts it, “it is our purposes that mold the
medium’s development and not the medium that determines our artistic purposes”
(“Specificity of Media” 27). Our conception of the film medium, then, should not
adjudicate between competing styles of filmmaking, such as montage and realism, but
account for both of them.
The medium-specificity theorists, then, have it all backwards. The work of film
theorists should not aim to discover the nature of the film medium, as it has for the past
century. Instead, it should aim to find new possibilities for the medium. In fact, Carroll
claims that “our interest in an art form is in large measure an interest in how artists learn
or discover new ways of using their medium” (“Specificity of Media” 32). Thus, the
medium-specificity project is actually at odds with our proper interest in art forms, and if

Balotskiy | 25
successful, would effectively eliminate one of our legitimate reasons for enjoying them,
namely observing how they evolve over time.
Earlier, I discussed Carroll’s rejection of the view that medium-specificity theorists
have any principled way of deciding which medium out of many is the one on which they
should base their claims. Carroll’s argument in that section further complicates the notion
that an art form’s medium could dictate how an artist ought to use that medium. If the
medium-specificity theorists are correct in arguing that each art form possesses a medium
unique to it, and that that medium has a certain nature that governs how it is to be used,
then the medium-specificity theorists must hold that each art form has only one such
medium—“one such medium” in the sense that it is the one unique medium on which
medium-specificity theorists can base their claims. If Carroll is correct, however, and art
forms are made up of multiple media, the medium-specificity theorists run into a problem.
Not only do the medium-specificity theorists have to sift through all the media that make
up the art form in order to isolate the one, relevant medium, but they also have to show
why the medium they chose is the one on which we should base their medium-specificity
arguments. It’s not clear, however, what criteria the medium-specificity theorists could
employ to address the above concern.

The medium is not a tool
The argument that the medium ought to be seen as a kind of artistic tool is not an
argument made by any actual medium-specificity theorist; however, Carroll believes that
it is an unfavorable consequence of their views. Imagine, for example, a mediumspecificity theorist saying something like the following:
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The medium of X has a distinctive nature with specific capacities—ones that
differentiate it from the media of other art forms—and it is precisely these
possibilities that the artist ought to explore rather than the effects that are
distinctive of the media that identify or individuate other art forms.
(“Medium Specificity” 37)
If an artist wishes to produce an artwork that does X, then, all the artist has to do
is open up her copy of Media for Dummies and identify the medium that is best suited for
handling X. Painting, for example, could be identified as the medium best suited for
handling two-dimensionality. Or sculpture could be identified as the medium best suited
for handling three-dimensionality. Carroll finds this characterization of the medium
deeply problematic. He argues that a particular medium, such as the film medium, is not
like a particular tool. Particular tools, such as Allen wrenches, have certain jobs to which
they are best put to use, such as turning hexagonal screws. Artists, however, should use
the medium in a multitude of ways, to explore all of the possibilities available to them,
instead of trying to find one individual purpose for which a given medium is best adapted.
Instead of comparing the medium to a tool, like an Allen wrench, Carroll thinks it’s more
instructive to compare the medium to human beings. Human beings, unlike tools, “are
not designed with a fixed function” and thus can adopt “a range of alternative, even
competing, lifestyles” (“Specificity of Media” 36). So too can a medium be used for a
range of alternative, even competing, artistic purposes.
Another way of thinking about this point is to remember that Carroll denies that
the medium has a particular nature that dictates how one ought to use it. If a medium
does not have such a dictating nature, however, then there’s no reason to think that the
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medium can only be used for one purpose. Furthermore, as discussed above, not only can
a particular medium be used for a range of alternative artistic purposes, but one of our
legitimate reasons for enjoying a particular medium is precisely to see how it has evolved
to be used for a range of alternative artistic purposes. If the medium was simply like a
tool and could be characterized by a single, fixed purpose, then we would not be
interested in its evolution over time.

Excellence, not efficiency, ought to be the measure by which we evaluate artworks
One positive implication of the medium-specificity view, according to Carroll, is
that it appears to allow us to easily develop standards by which to evaluate art works.
Good films, for example, are cinematic, which is to say that “they engage in and exploit
the distinctive properties of the medium [of film]” (“Medium Specificity” 38). Bad films,
on the other hand, are not cinematic, which is to say that “they have failed to take
advantage of the special resources and distinctive capabilities of [the medium of film]”
(“Medium Specificity” 38).
Keeping this evaluative framework in mind, we can articulate the concept of
efficient filmmaking. An efficient filmmaker, in the course of creating a film, attempts to
and succeeds in maximizing the film’s exploitation of the distinctive properties of the
medium. An inefficient filmmaker, on the other hand, either fails to or does not even try
to maximize the film’s exploitation of the distinctive properties of the medium. If we
follow the precepts of the medium-specificity theorist, we ought to identify efficient
filmmaking with good filmmaking, and inefficient filmmaking with bad filmmaking.
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In practice, however, this way of thinking quickly runs into problems. As Carroll
points out, as soon as a theorist develops an evaluative framework based on mediumspecificity claims, like the one above, the opponent of medium-specificity can identify an
art work that fails to meet the evaluative criterion, yet is almost universally lauded as an
art work.
Carroll thinks that this is especially true of the history of film. Theorists such as
the French realists who claim that the film medium dictates that films ought to be
realistic, in the sense that they should employ long-take, deep-focus shots, have to account
for how films like Sergei Eisenstein’s The Battleship Potemkin (1925) have secured their
place in the canon. Likewise, theorists such as the Russian montagists who claim that the
film medium dictates that films ought to be rapidly edited have to account for how films
like Jean Renoir’s The Rules of the Game (1939) have secured their place in the canon.
This, according to Carroll, often leads to absurd results, such as theorists biting the bullet
and arguing that canonical film classics do not really deserve their place in the canon.
The confusion, argues Carroll, arises out of the medium-specificity theorists’
equivocation regarding the status of their theories. According to Carroll, mediumspecificity theorists have pitched their theories as being both empirical hypotheses and a
priori, or what Carroll calls analytic, definitions, sometimes not realizing that they
equivocate between the two in the course of their theorizing (“Forget the Medium!” 5).
An empirical medium-specificity hypothesis might take the following form:
(EH) When looking at the history of film, we find that the best films are
those that are made efficiently, which is to say that the best films are those
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in which the filmmakers sought to and succeeded in maximizing the film’s
exploitation of the distinctive properties of the medium.6
An a priori definition would look very similar to the empirical hypothesis, only it would
be stated in absolute terms, ignoring the history of film. An a priori definition, then,
might take the following form:
(AD) The best films are those that are made efficiently, which is to say that
the best films are those in which the filmmakers sought to and succeeded in
maximizing the film’s engagement in and exploitation of the distinctive
properties of the medium.
Carroll identifies problems with both of these approaches. For example, if we take
medium-specificity theorists to be articulating the empirical hypothesis, then we see that it
is easily falsifiable, as shown above by the cases of The Battleship Potemkin and The
Rules of the Game. On the other hand, if we take the medium-specificity theorists to be
articulating the latter a priori definition, then it seems obvious that the medium-specificity
theorists are simply begging the question. If there really do exist art works that are almost
universally lauded, yet fail to meet the medium-specificity theorists’ a priori definition, the
medium-specificity theorists cannot simply appeal to the definition they’ve crafted. They
must provide independent reasons for why the films in question should not be considered
excellent, reasons that do not depend on their a priori definition.

6

Since I’m only offering a general formulation, I have kept this part of the hypothesis
general. A theorist making an argument of this kind, however, would have to replace that
general pronouncement with a specific description of what the distinctive properties of the
medium are. This same point will apply below.

Balotskiy | 30
Thus, though it initially appears that the medium-specificity theorists’ views allow
us to easily develop standards by which to evaluate art works, what we actually find,
argues Carroll, is that the medium-specificity theorists are able only to account for art
works that match their theories. They are unable, however, to account for general
excellence, which is what Carroll believes really matters. Simply being efficient, in the
sense that the art work in question coheres to the medium-specificity theorists’ theories,
does not necessarily make an art work good, and the medium-specificity theorists’
inability to account for this is a strike against their theories.

A summary of Carroll’s view
Carroll believes that most if not all art forms with identifiable physical media do
not have a single medium. Furthermore, even if medium-specificity theorists could isolate
the single, relevant physical medium on which to base their claims, they would still run
into problems. Media do not dictate how they ought to be used. The medium should not
be put towards a single, identifiable purpose. Instead, our notion of what we can do with
a medium—if we even need such a notion—ought to be based on what purposes artists
have already used that medium for and what they may use it for in the future. What we
will find when we make this kind of inquiry, however, is that no medium is put towards a
single purpose. Instead, artists make use of particular media to achieve a multitude of
artistic purposes.
When laid out in this way, we can see why Carroll thinks that the conclusions of
medium-specificity theorists should be resisted. What medium specificity-theorists do,
according to Carroll, is identify a single artistic purpose out of many, such as the
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reproduction of reality in the case of film or the exploration of flatness in the case of
painting, and claim that that particular artistic purpose is the only one dictated by the
nature of the medium and thus worth pursuing. However, if we take on board what
Carroll has to say, then it appears that all determinations of this sort will “inevitably [be]
informed by one’s own prior stylistic preferences” (“Forget the Medium!” 7). Instead of
celebrating the multitude of artistic purposes to which a single medium could be put,
medium-specificity theorists, on Carroll’s view, arbitrarily choose the one artistic purpose
that most closely aligns with their aesthetic preferences, and restrict the entire art form
which makes use of that medium to that one artistic purpose.
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